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Abstract—How can a buyer legitimately benefit from group
discounts while preserving his privacy? We show how this can
be achieved when buyers can use their own computing device (e.g.
smartphone or computer) to perform a purchase. Specifically, we
present a protocol for privacy-preserving group discounts. The
protocol allows a group of buyers to prove how many they are
without disclosing their identities. Coupled with an anonymous
payment system, this allows group discounts to be compatible
with buyer privacy.
Keywords—Buyer privacy, Group discounts, Cryptographic
protocols, Digital signatures
I. INTRODUCTION
Group discounts are offered by vendors to encourage con-
sumers to use their services, to promote more efficient use
of resources, to protect the environment, etc. Examples in-
clude group tickets for museums, stadiums or leisure parks,
discounted highway tolls or parking fees for high-occupancy
vehicles, etc. It is common for the vendor to require all group
members to identify themselves, but in reality this is seldom
strictly necessary.
We make the assumption that the important feature about the
group is the number of its members, rather than their identities.
A secondary feature that may often (not always) be relevant
for a group discount is whether group members are physically
together.
Anonymously proving the number of group members and
their being together is trivial in a face-to-face setting with a
human verifier, who can see that the required number of people
are present. However, with an automatic verifier and/or in an
on-line setting, this becomes far from obvious.
In this paper, we propose a method to prove the number of
people in a group while preserving the anonymity of group
members and without requiring specific dedicated hardware,
except for a computing device with some wireless commu-
nication capabilities (e.g. NFC, Bluetooth or WiFi). Also, we
explore the option to include payment in our proposed system,
which is necessary for group discounts. We complete the
description of our method with a possible anonymous payment
mechanism, scratch cards. The method presented here is a
generalization of a specific protocol for toll discounts in high-
occupancy vehicles, whose patent we recently filed [6].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
describes the building blocks of our method, namely a digital
signature scheme, a key management scheme, an anonymous
payment scheme and wireless communication technologies;
the latter technologies should be short-range in applications
where one wants to check that the group members are
physically together. Section III describes our actual group
size accreditation method, including the required entities and
protocols. In Section IV, we give a complexity estimation of
our proposal. Section V sketches conclusions and future work
ideas.
II. BUILDING BLOCKS
Our group size accreditation method is based on an identity-
based dynamic threshold (IBDT) signature scheme, namely a
particular case of the second protocol proposed in [7].
Threshold signature schemes are commonly based on (t, n)-
threshold secret sharing schemes, such as the ones introduced
in [1] and [12], and they require a minimum number t of
participants to produce a valid signature. Dynamic threshold
signature schemes differ from the previous ones in that the
threshold t is not fixed during the setup phase, but is declared
at the moment of signing. Our method takes advantage of this
feature to find out how many users participated in the signature
of a particular message, and consequently how many people
form a group. If one wishes to prove that the signature is not
only computed by at least t participants, but also that these
are together in the same place, the above signature schemes
need to be complemented with short-range communication
technologies.
On the other hand, identity-based public key signature
schemes, theorized by Shamir in [13] and with the first
concrete protocol, based on the Weil pairing, developed by
Boneh et al. in [3], allow public keys pkU to be arbitrary
strings of some length, which we call identities. These strings
are associated with a user U and reflect some aspect of his
identity, e.g. his email address. The corresponding secret key
skU is then computed by a trusted entity, the certification
authority (CA), taking as input the user’s identity and, possibly,
some secret information held only by the CA, and is sent
to the user U through some secure channel. Identity-based
public key signature schemes offer a great flexibility in key
generation and management and our method takes advantage
of this feature by proposing a key management scheme that
allows preserving the anonymity of the participants.
Finally, in most group discounts, a fee must be paid after
proving the number of group members, so an anonymous
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payment method is needed. Indeed, this method should not
reveal additional information about the group members to the
service provider.
A. IBDT Signature Scheme
We outline a general identity-based dynamic threshold sig-
nature scheme, namely the second protocol proposed in [7].
Our protocol will be a slight modification of this general case;
we will point out differences when needed. A general IBDT
signature scheme consists of the following five probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms.
IBDT 1. Setup is a randomized trusted setup algorithm that
takes as input a security parameter λ, a universe of identities
ID and an integer n which is the upper bound on the size of
the threshold policies, i.e. the maximum number of users that
can participate in a threshold signature. It outputs a set of
public parameters pms and a master key pair msk and mpk.
An execution of this algorithm is denoted as
(pms,mpk,msk)← Setup (λ, ID, n) .
IBDT 2. Keygen is a key extraction algorithm that takes as
input the public parameters pms, the master key pair msk and
mpk, and an identity id ∈ ID. The output is a private key
SKid. An execution of this algorithm is denoted as
SKid ← Keygen (pms,mpk,msk, id) .
IBDT 3. Sign is a randomized signing algorithm that takes
as input the public parameters pms, the master public key
mpk, a user’s secret key SKid, a message Msg ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
a threshold signing policy Γ = (t, S) where S ⊂ ID and
1 ≤ t ≤ |S| ≤ n. Note that, in our case, t will be strictly
equal to |S|. It outputs a partial signature σid. We denote an
execution of this algorithm as
σid ← Sign (pms,mpk, SKid,Msg,Γ) .
IBDT 4. Comb is a deterministic signing algorithm which
takes as input the public parameters pms, the master public
key mpk, a message Msg, a threshold signing policy Γ = (t, S)
and the partial signatures of the set St, with |St| ≥ t (again,
|St| = t in our case), and outputs a global signature σ. We
denote the action taken by the signing algorithm as
σ ← Comb (pms,mpk, SKid,Msg,Γ, {σid}id∈St) .
IBDT 5. Verify is a deterministic verification algorithm that
takes as input the public parameters pms, a master public key
mpk, a message Msg, a global signature σ and a threshold
policy Γ = (t, S). It outputs 1 if the signature is deemed valid
and 0 otherwise. We denote an execution of this algorithm as
b← Verify (pms,mpk,Msg, σ,Γ) .
For correctness, for any λ ∈ N, any integer n ∈ poly(λ),
any universe ID, any set of public parameters and master key
pair (pms,mpk,msk), and any threshold policy Γ = (t, S)
where 1 ≤ t ≤ |S|, it is required that for
σ = Comb (pms,mpk, SKid,Msg,Γ, {σid}id∈St) ,
Verify (pms,mpk,Msg, σ) = 1
whenever the values pms, mpk, msk have been obtained by
properly executing the Setup algorithm, |St| ≥ t, and for each
id ∈ St, σid ← Sign(pms,mpk, SKid,Msg,Γ) and SKid ←
Keygen(pms,mpk,msk, id).
B. Key Management
The anonymity provided by our accreditation method is a re-
sult of our key generation protocol and management solution.
As we stated above, identity-based public key cryptosystems
allow using arbitrary strings as public keys. In our protocol,
every user Ui is given an ordered list of public keys that
depend on some unique identifier of the user, such as his
national identity card number, his phone number, the IMEI
number of his phone or a combination of any of them. We
will call this identifier nUi = d
i
kd
i
k−1 . . . d
i
1, where d
i
j is the
j-th last digit of nUi and typically ranges from 0 to 9.
To generate the list of public keys from an identifier nUi ,
we choose a value ` < k and take the ` last digits of nUi .
This results in a vector of public keys
PKUi =
{
pk
di1
1 , . . . , pk
di`
`
}
,
with every pk
dij
j being an encoding of the digit and its position
in nUi , for example:
pk
dij
j = j || dij ,
where || is the concatenation operation. To illustrate this
process, imagine nUi = 12345678 and ` = 4. The resulting
public key list would be
PKUi = {18, 27, 36, 45} .
To prove the number of members in a group, the members
will choose a common integer j ∈ {1, . . . , `} so that the j-th
public key in their list, i.e. pk
dij
j , is different for all of them.
Then they will perform the required operations with these
public keys and their corresponding private keys. Assuming
that the values of the digits range from 0 to 9, this would
provide anonymity to each of the users, since on average 10%
of people will share the same public key pk
dij
j for some value
of j.
Note that this approach limits the size of the groups that can
be certified with our method to a maximum of 10. Moreover,
intuition tells us that the closer the size of the group to this
maximum size, the more difficult it becomes to find a value
of j for which each user has a different public key. The
probability that our protocol fails depends on the number of
keys each user is given, `, and the size of the group n; more
specifically for n ≤ 10:
F (`, n) =
(
1− 10(10− 1) . . . (10− n+ 1)
10n
)`
,
that is very close to 1 for values of n close to 10.
The limit on the maximum value of n can be increased by
assigning d ≥ 2 digits of nUi to each of the ` public keys,
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instead of just one digit. By doing this, the maximum value
for the size of the groups becomes 10d, and the probability of
failure, for values of n ≤ 10d, is
F (`, n, d) =
(
1− 10
d(10d − 1) . . . (10d − n+ 1)
10dn
)`
.
However, the price to be paid for choosing a larger d is a
loss of anonymity, since, if more digits are associated to each
public key, less users share the same public key. For example,
for d = 2 a user would share each of his keys with only 1%
of the total number of users. The service provider will choose
` and d depending on maximum number of keys that a user
can store, the maximum allowed group size and the anonymity
level to be guaranteed.
C. Anonymous Payment Mechanisms
Group discounts are one of the applications of our method:
after proving the group size, the group members must pay
a fee that depends on that size. If proving the size has been
done anonymously, it would be pointless to subsequently use a
non-anonymous payment protocol (such as credit card, PayPal,
etc.).
Hence, we need to use an anonymous payment mechanism
along with our group size accreditation protocol. Electronic
cash protocols such as [4] are good candidates for this
role. Nowadays, Bitcoin [10] is a well-established electronic
currency and, although it is not anonymous by design [11],
it can be a good solution if accompanied by careful key
management policies. Also, extensions of the original protocol
as Zerocoin [9] provide anonymity by design.
In this work we propose a much simpler approach based
on prepaid scratch cards that users can buy at stores. Each
such card contain a code Pay.Code which the service provider
will associate with a temporal account holding a fixed credit
specified by the card denomination.
D. Communication Technologies
Our accreditation method requires communication among
the members of a group and between the members and some
type of verifying device. If we want to prove not only that a
group has a certain number of members, but also that these
are together, the interactions with the verifying device must
rely on short-range communication technologies, like NFC,
Bluetooth or WiFi.
During the accreditation protocol, the users’ smartphones
will be detected in some way by the verifying device and a
communication channel will be established. The requirements
and constraints of this process depend on the type of service
and verifying devices, but nonetheless it is desirable that
communication establishment be fast and not too cumbersome
to the user.
We propose to use Bluetooth, and in particular Bluetooth
Smart (BLE) [2] to communicate with the verifying device.
BLE solves some of the main limitations of traditional Blue-
tooth, i.e. reduces detection and bonding times, requires much
less work by the user than NFC and has a shorter range than
both Bluetooth and WiFi, which is desirable in a method like
ours. Finally, BLE is implemented by most major smartphone
manufacturers, at least in recent models, unlike NFC.
Regarding communication between the smartphones, any
of the three mentioned technologies, or a combination of
them (e.g. Bluetooth pairing through NFC messages) seems
appropriate. The choice is up to the service provider.
III. GROUP SIZE ACCREDITATION METHOD
A service that implements our accreditation method includes
the following elements:
• A service provider (SP) that publishes a smartphone
application AppU and distributes the necessary public
parameters and keys of an IBDT signature scheme Π to
users, after some registration process.
• A smartphone application AppU for each user U which:
– allows computing signatures with Π on behalf of U ;
– allows computing ciphertexts with a public-key encryp-
tion scheme Π′ selected by SP, under SP’s public key
pkSP ;
– can be run on master or slave mode, which affects how
AppU participates in the accreditation protocol.
– includes some certificate which allows checking the
validity of pkSP ;
– implements some communication protocol, relying in
short-range communication technologies, such as NFC
or Bluetooth, to interact with the applications of the
rest of the members of the group and with the verifying
devices.
• Prepaid payment scratch cards available at stores. Each
card includes a code Pay.Code that the SP associates
to an account with a fixed credit specified by the card
denomination.
• Verifying devices installed at suitable places in the
provider’s infrastructures which:
– allow verifying signatures with Π;
– hold the SP certificates as well as the keys needed to
decrypt ciphertexts produced with Π′ under pkSP .
– have short-range communication capabilities and im-
plement some protocol to communicate with the users’
devices.
• Some method to penalize or prevent the misuse of the
system.
The complete accreditation protocol runs as follows:
Protocol 1. System setup protocol.
1) SP chooses the user identifier to be used as nU and
appropriate values for ` and d.
2) SP generates the parameters of the IBDT signature
scheme Π as per Algorithm IBDT.Setup;
3) SP generates the parameters of the public-key encryption
scheme Π′.
Protocol 2. Registration protocol.
72 J. Domingo-Ferrer, A. Blanco-Justicia
1) A user U with identifier nU authenticates himself to the
service provider, face-to-face or by some other means.
The user receives a PIN code pinU .
2) The service provider associates to U a vector of public
keys of Π, PKid as described in Section II-B.
3) The service provider computes the secret keys associated
to PKid as per Algorithm IBDT.Keygen:
SKid =
(
sk
did1
1 , . . . , sk
did`
`
)
.
4) The user downloads the smartphone application AppU
and, using the PIN code pinU , completes the registration
protocol and receives the system parameters and keys, as
well as the public key pkSP .
Protocol 3. Credit purchase.
1) A user buys a prepaid card for the system, e.g. a scratch
card, from a store.
2) The card includes some code Pay.Code which has to be
introduced in the smartphone application.
Protocol 4. Group setup protocol.
1) Some user U∗, among the group of users U1, . . . , Ut who
want to use the service, takes the leading role. This user
will be responsible for most of the communication with
the verifying device. U∗ sets his smartphone application
to run in master mode and the others set it to work in
slave mode.
2) The users agree on a value j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `} such that
the value of the j-th public key in PKid is different for
every user.
Protocol 5. Group size accreditation protocol.
1) A verifying device detects the users’ devices and sends
them a unique timestamped ticket T that may include a
description of the service conditions and options.
2) Each user Ui runs Algorithm IBDT.Sign to compute a
partial signature with Π under his secret key sk
dij
j on
message
Msg =
〈
T || pkd
1
j
j || . . . || pk
dtj
j
〉
,
for the threshold predicate Γ = (t, {pkd
1
j
j , . . . , pk
dtj
j }). It
sends the resulting partial signature σi to U∗.
3) U∗ receives (σ1, . . . , σt) and runs Algorithm
IBDT.Comb to combine these signatures and output a
final signature σ on behalf of U1, . . . , Ut. U∗ sends to
the verifying device
Msg′ = 〈Msg, σ〉 .
4) The verifier device checks the validity of the signature by
running
IBDT.Verify(Msg, σ, pk
d1j
j || . . . ||pk
dtj
j , t).
Note that this signature will only be valid if all users
U1, . . . , Ut have collaborated in computing it, and thus
it proves that the group of users is composed of at least
t people. If the signature is not valid, the group will
be penalized in an application-dependent way, e.g. with
access denial, group discount denial, etc. Otherwise, the
service provider grants access to the group of users and
tells the group the amount amountt they have to pay
depending on the group size.
Protocol 6. Payment.
1) Each group member U in the (sub)set P of group
members who want to collaborate in paying the bill sends
to the verifying device via Bluetooth or WiFi his payment
code encrypted under SP’s public key:
CU = EncpkSP (T||Pay.CodeU ),
where Pay.CodeU is the code which user U obtained from
a prepaid scratch card and where Enc is the public-key
encryption algorithm of scheme Π′.
2) The verifying device decrypts the ciphertexts {CU : U ∈
P} to obtain the payment codes of the users in P .
3) The verifier device substracts the quantity amountt di-
vided by the cardinal of P to the accounts associated
with the received payment codes.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Our group size accreditation method is to be run by service
providers, specialized verifying devices and the users’ smart-
phones. Therefore, it is important that the computations of
the underlying cryptographic protocol be as fast as possible,
especially the algorithms that are executed by the smartphones,
which have limited computational capabilities and rely on
batteries.
In this section, we analyze the performance of the under-
lying IBDT signature scheme. This scheme is a pairing-based
cryptographic protocol and as such, the required operations are
performed in elliptic curve groups. We analyze its performance
by counting the number of point multiplications, point expo-
nentiations and pairings, which are the most costly operations.
Table I shows the number of these operations for each of
the algorithms in the IBDT signature scheme. The number of
operations is counted as a function of the maximum number
of possible participants in a signature, n, and the size of the
signing group t. As we stated previously, t ≤ n.
TABLE I
OPERATIONS REQUIRED PER ALGORITHM
Multiplications Exponentiations Pairings
Setup 0 n+ 4 1
Keygen 2n 4n 0
Sign 2n+ 6 2n+ 5 0
Comb 2n− t+ 1 2n− t 0
Verify n+ 2 n+ 1 4
Note that the IBDT.Sign and IBDT.Comb algorithms, that
are intended to be executed in the users’ smartphones during
the group size accreditation protocol (5), present what seems
Anonymous and Contactless Accreditation Method for Groups of Users 73
to be a quite high number of operations. This might be a
problem if the devices in which these algorithms are to be
executed do not have enough computational power. Moreover,
these two algorithms should precisely be most efficient, since
they are run most often, and possibly with time constraints.
Therefore, it would be interesting if we could precompute
some of their operations.
The IBDT.Sign algorithm is a probabilistic protocol, that
is, it has some random values in it that have to be refreshed
each time it is executed. This limits the amount of operations
in the algorithm that can be precomputed. On the other hand,
most of the operations depend on static values, e.g. keys and
threshold policies Γ. Threshold policies contain the number
of signers that will participate in a signature and their public
keys. We assume that groups of users will be quite stable, i.e.
users will generally use services together with the same group
members, or at least with a limited set of different groups. We
can exploit this assumption by precomputing operations that
only depend on static values and threshold policies.
The IBDT.Comb algorithm obviously depends on the output
of IBDT.Sign, but it is a deterministic algorithm and some of
its operations depend on static values and also on the threshold
policies. Therefore, by the same assumption as before, we can
precompute some of the operations.
These precomputations will divide the IBDT.Sign and
IBDT.Comb algorithms in two phases each, one for precom-
puting values, which will be executed during the group setup
protocol (Protocol 4), and the other one performed during the
group size accreditation protocol (Protocol 5). The resulting
number of operations in each of these phases is shown in
Table II. It can be seen that the non-precomputable IBDT.Sign
that needs to be run during the group size accreditation
protocol involves a very small constant number of operations.
The non-precomputable IBDT.Comb is not so light, but it is
nonetheless lighter than IBDT.Comb without precomputation
(Table I), because it no longer depends on the number n of
users.
TABLE II
NUMBER OF PRECOMPUTABLE AND NON-PRECOMPUTABLE OPERATIONS
FOR THE SIGN AND COMB ALGORITHMS.
Multiplications Exponentiations Pairings
Prec. Sign 2n+ 2 2n+ 1 0
Non-prec. Sign 2 4 0
Prec. Comb 2n− 2t 2n− 2t 0
Non-prec. Comb 3t+ 1 3t 0
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a privacy-preserving mechanism for
group discounts. The method is built upon an IBDT signature
scheme, a concrete key generation and management solution,
short-range communication technologies and anonymous pay-
ment mechanisms. The complexity analysis shows that the
method is usable in practice.
Future work will consist of developing a generic app for
privacy-preserving group discounts that can be easily cus-
tomized for specific applications.
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